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MULTIPLE CRITERIA GAMES - THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 
Andrze j P. wierzbickiL 
After a review of basic concepts in multiple criteria optimization, 
the paper presents a characterization of noncooperative equilibria in 
multiple criteria games in normal form either by weighted sums or by 
order-consistent achievement scalarizing functions, for convex and 
nonconvex cases. Possible applications of multiple criteria games and 
such characterizations of their equilibria are indicated. The analysis 
of multiple criteria games night be especially useful when studying 
reasons of possible conflict escalation processes and ways of 
preventing them. 
1. Introduction. 
While the main body of game theory deals with multiple criteria under 
the assumptions that they either can be scalarized by a given value or 
utility function or represented by additional players, there are many cases 
where such assumptions are not justified. This was often pointed out, e. g. 
by Blackwell [1956], Contini [1966], Yu [1973], Zeleny [19761. Although the 
basic concepts of a multi-objective version of game theory were defined and 
analyzed by Bergstresser and Yu [1977], this theory was not fully developed 
subsequently . 
However, if the aim of investigation is to help in understanding 
game-like situations - e.g. in multi-objective decision support systems - 
rather than to predict possible outcomes of a game, then a fully multi- 
objective extension of game theory is necessary. In realistic game-like 
situations we often do not precisely know how to aggregate the values or 
criteria motivating each player into a value or utility function. On the 
other hand, in order to analyze such multiple criteria games theoretically 
or to compute their possible solutions, it is useful to introduce an 
aggregation of criteria by appropriate scalarizing functions. 
1 Institute of Automatic Control, Warsaw University of Technology, 
Nowowiejska 15/19, 00-665 Warsaw, Poland. Materials for the paper were 
prepared during a stay at the Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto, 
Japan; final version was prepared at the International Institute for 
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Such an aggregation, however, is used only as a tool of analysis and 
differs from the typical aggregation by a value or utility function. 
Although scalarizing functions might be interpreted as proxy value 
functions, they must posses certain additional properties that will be 
analyzed in detail in this paper. In particular, such scalarizing functions 
must be parameterized in such a way as to enable an easy scanning and 
selection of game equilibria, independently of convexity properties. 
A specific property of equilibria in multiple criteria games is that 
there might be not only many of them, but they also might form sets of 
continuum power. Thus, if one player focuses his/her attention on one such 
equilibrium but does not communicate with other players, it is almost 
inevitable that others would select other equilibria. The resulting actions 
of all players correspond then to a disequilibrium outcome, usually worse 
than predicted; in repetitive games, this might easily lead to conflict 
escalation processes. One of main applications of the analysis of 
noncooperative solutions in multiple criteria games might be related to 
studying the reasons and ways of preventing conflict escalation. 
2. Needed Concepts from Multiple Criteria Optimization. 
The basic concepts of multiple criteria optimization are sufficiently 
well described, see e. g, Sawaragi et al. [19851, Yu [19851, Steuer [19861, 
Seo and Sakawa [1988]. We recall some of them and add some extensions. 
A set Xo of admissible decisions x and a model f: Xo -, Y of their 
impacts define the set Yo = f(X of attainable decision outcomes y 
0 
contained in an outcome space Y; compact Y c Y = # is assumed here. 
0 
Moreover, it is assumed that domination structures in Y - see e.g. Yu 
[I9851 - are implied by a positive (nonempty, pointed, closed and convex) 
cone in this space. The simplest positive cone corresponds to the 
maximization of all objectives or outcomes: 
- n9 (1) C = ty E #: yi > 0, i = I,. . .PI = + 
while minimized objectives can be taken into account by changing their 
signs. Another type of positive cone expresses the assumption that some 
objectives are stabilized, i.e. kept close to a given reference level: 
This cone has an empty interior; for this and other reasons, it is useful 
to consider &-conical neighborhoods of a given positive cone C. Such 
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neighborhoods are the interiors of the following extended cones: 
For this definition, we can use any norm and define dist(y,C) as a 
Haussdorf distance between y and the set C; this distance can correspond to 
any other norm (since all norms in # are topologically equivalent). The 
cone C(c) has a nonempty interior for any c > 0; but it might be not convex 
even if C is convex. If C = Ff and the norm 1 is consistently used in (31, 1 
then the cone C(c) is convex; another, very useful convex cone C(E) is 
obtained if the norm l1 is used in the right-hand side of the inequality in 
(3 )  and an extended Chebyshev norm is used to define the distance. Such a 
cone can be represented in a number of equivalent forms (see Wierzbicki 
[I9901 1. Let y(-) denote a vector with components y ( - )  = min (0, y 1 which i i 
determines the distance of y to ; then: 
P 
= {yet?: y = 1 X y('! X 0) with y(')= (-e, -c, . . l+(p-I)& T 3 J - ( J ) ,  .-&,-&I , j=1 
P P 
C ,  = {ye#: -yj 5 c yi, j = 1 .  p = {yet?: min yi+ c 1 yi+ O) 
i=1 1siSp i=l 
The last form of this cone is especially important: it indicates that the 
P 
cone is the zero-level set of the function min yi+ e 1 yi. 
lsisp i=l 
Given a positive cone, we define usually the weak, strict and strong 
inequalities in the outcome space as (weak) y" rC y' H y"- y ' ~  C, (strict) 
Y" >C Y' H y"- y ' ~  = C\{O), (strong) y" > intC y' H y"- y ' ~  int C. 
Accordingly, the set of weakly efficient outcomes is defined as: 
A A 
= {y E Yo: Y n (y + int C) = 0) 
0 
where 0 denotes empty set. Weakly efficient outcomes are the easiest to 
analyze mathematically, but impractical in applications: for example, if C 
has the form (2), all attainable outcomes are weakly efficient. The set of 
efficient outcomes: 
is more difficult to analyze; but, as it is known since Geoffrion [19681, 
this set contains improperly efficient outcomes with unbounded trade-off 
coefficients, which is also impractical. There are various definitions of 
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trade-off coefficients; a general one (for C = $, but with Yo not 
necessarily smooth nor convex) might be as follows: 
(7a) t (y) = sup 
i .I y -  yi)/(yj - y 1 ,  Y E Yo, where: .I 
ysy(J) (j) 
(7b) Y(')(;) = {y E Yo: 
A A 
yj < yj, yi yi for i + .I} 
These are global trade-off coefficients that can be only greater as 
the local ones for which the supremum is restricted to sequences convergent 
A 
to y; in the convex case there is no difference between the global and the 
local trade-off coefficients. 
There are also various definitions of properly efficient outcomes, see 
e.g. Benson [I9771 or Henig [19821; a most practical one corresponds to 
such that have a specified prior and finite bound on trade-off 
coefficients. As suggested by Wierzbicki [19771, [19901, such definition 
can be obtained with the help of the extended cone C(c), e.g. as follows: 
( 8 )  Ypc = {j E yo: Y n (; + int ~(c)) = 01 
0 0 
The union of YEC over all c > 0 gives the set of properly efficient 
outcomes Yp as defined e.g. by Henig [19821. 
0 
A A 
Efficient decisions x and outcomes y can be obtained by maximizing a 
1 
scalarizing function s(y,a) with y = f(x) over x E Xo, where s: Y x A + lR , 
A is a set of parameters, a E A is a parameter controlling the selection of 
efficient outcomes. This is sufficient for obtaining (weakly, properly) 
efficient outcomes provided that the scalarizing function s is strictly 
monotone with respect to y, in the sense of the inequality implied by the 
cone (or int C, or int C(c) - in the last case, this means that s(yS,a) > 
s(yM,a) for all y', y" such that y' - y" E int C(c) and all a E A). How- 
ever, in practical applications we need also a controllability property of 
scalarizing functions related to a necessary condition of efficiency: 
n 
Definition 1. A scalarizing function s(y,a) with a E A G A gives a 
(almost) completely controllable parameterization or a complete characteri- 
zation of the set of efficient outcomes G (or or YE'), if for (almost) 
A A A - 0 A 
all y E Y there exists an a E A" such that y can be obtained by maximizing 
0 
(over x E X with y = f(x) or, equivalently, over y E Y 1 the function 
A 0 0 
s(y,a). This parameterization or characterization is continuously control- 
A A 
lable, if the resulting dependence of y on a is Lipschitz continuous. 
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Most powerful tools in examining necessary conditions of optimality 
are separation theorems. Usually, we apply linear separating functions; we 
could apply nonlinear ones, but the variety of nonlinear functions is too 
large to choose a useful class of them, at least in scalar optimization. In 
vector or multiple criteria optimization, however, there is a useful class 
of nonlinear separating functions that results in controllable parameter- 
ization~ of efficient outcomes even in non-convex cases. This class is 
related to the following basic lemma on conical separation of sets; to 
formulate this lemma, we denote s(y,a) = r(y) and recall that a function 
r: V + R' strictly separates two disjoint sets Y',Y8' c V at a point y E Y', 
if r(y)'s r(y) for all y E Ys and r(y) > r(y) for all y E Y". 
1 Lemma 2. The statement that a function r: V + R strictly separates, 
at any point y E Y the set Yo and the shifted cone y + ? (or y + int C, 
0' 
or y + int C(c)), is equivalent to three simultaneous statements: 
(i) y maximizes r(y) over y E Y e  
0' 
(ii) y E Go, it is efficient (or y E ?. o r  y E YEC); 
(iii) r(y) is strictly monotone (at least at the point y, in the sense 
of the cone ?, int C, or int C(e) - i.e. r(y) > r(y), V y - y E int ~(e)). 
This lemma is elementary, but might be fundamental to all multiple 
criteria optimization. Therefore, we give here the proof. The separation 
property can be rewritten as r(y) 1 r(y) for all y E Yo, which is equi- 
valent to (i), and also as r(y) < r(y) for all y E y + ?, which is equi- 
valent to (iii). Suppose the separation property holds and y is not 
efficient; then there would exist a point y' E Y such that also y ' ~  y + ?, 
0 
which is impossible, since we cannot have r(y') s 0 and r(y') > 0 at the 
same time. Thus, separation implies (ii). Conversely, if (i), (ii), (iii) 
hold, then r(y) s r(y) for all y E Yo from (I), and r(y) < r(y) for all 
y E y + ? from (iii), which is equivalent to separation. 
If the set Y is convex, we could use linear separating functions: 
0 
where a = h E A are interpreted as weighting coefficients. The assumptions 
on A that result in the appropriate monotonicity of this function depend on 
the cone we are separating. As it is known, in the case of the cone ? only 
an almost complete characterization is possible (see e.g. Wierzbicki 
[19861). In the case of the cones int C or int C(e), it is sufficient to 
take their polar cones in order to obtain a complete characterization: 
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# # T (9b) A = A" = C (&)\{O); C (E) = {A E #: A y 2 0 for all y E c(E)) 
Lemna 3 (Wierzbicki 119901 1. Suppose Yo is convex, C = Ff, C(c) = 
C(c,ll,lm), and the scalarizing function (9a) is used with normalized = 
- 
i 
I' 
A Then A E R if and only if r 6 = c/(l+pc); for such A, ifny 
j=l J' 
maximizes the function (9a) with respect to y E Yo, then j E GPC. Moreover, 
t (j) 5 l+l/c = 1-p+l/6 for all ; E Gpc. Conversely, for every properly 
i J 
efficient y with such bound on trade-off coefficients, there exists A E 
n 
such that the maximum of function (9a) is attained at y. 
The specific bound on trade-off coefficients obtained in this lemma 
does not actually depend on the convexity of Y The (billinear scalarizing 
0' 
function (9a) has, however, several drawbacks even in the convex case; for 
example, the parameterization obtained by this function is not continuously 
controllable even in the simplest case when Yo is a polytope (e.g. in the 
case of multiple criteria linear programming). Thus it is better to use 
nonlinear functions that separate positive cones; such functions result in 
characterizations of efficient outcomes also for non-convex or discrete 
cases. An example of nonlinear functions that have such a conical 
separation property (for C = $1 is as follows: 
where the controlling parameters a = y are interpreted as reference or 
aspiration points in the objective space; the use of such controlling 
parameters has many advantages over the more typical use of weighting 
coefficients and the methods related to them are called reference point 
methods or aspiration-led methods. Function (10) can be interpreted in 
- 
various ways, e.g. as a strict penalty function for constraints yi r yi. 
However, its most important properties are that it is strictly monotone in 
the sense of the cone int C(c) for all y E # and strictly separates 
int C(e) from Yo if y E $Ee. 
Theorem 4 (Wierzbicki, [19861). Suppose y E A is a reference or 
aspiration point and s: Y x A + IR1 is a continuous order-consistent 
scalarizing function, i.e. it has two following properties: 
(a) monotonicity: W YEA, s(y',y) > S(~",V) W y9,y": y'- y"~int C(E); 
- 
(b) order representation: W ~ E A ,  {~EY: s(~,?) r 0) = y + C(c), 
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where A 2 qEC. c = 0 (if c = 0, qEo = $: and the case of weak efficiency is 
thus included 1. Then: 
(1) For any y E A, each maximal point of s(y. G I  over y E Yo is in YEC; 
*PC A (2) For each y E Yo , there exists y E A (e.g. G = y) such that s(y,y) 
A 
attains its maximum over y E Y at y. 
0 
Function (10) has both properties (a,b) and is a simplest example of 
an order-consistent function; under additional assumptions, this function 
results also in a continuously controllable parameterization (Wierzbicki 
[19861). However, Theorem 4 is much more general (it is valid also in 
Banach spaces provided Y is compact) and can be used with many other forms 
0 
of order-consistent scalarizing functions. 
In particular, consider a case when Y = #, C is defined as in (2) and 
a decision-maker (an user of a multiple criteria optimization package or a 
decision support system, a player in a multiple criteria game) is imprecise 
about his/her preferences on decision outcome values but can specify and 
modify fuzzy membership functions for his/her satisfaction with these 
outcome values. For fuzzy maximized outcomes, it is necessary to assume 
that the membership functions are strictly monotone, e.g. (see Granat at 
al. . [I9921 1: 
- - (lla) p.(y ,y . = 0.5(tanh(ai(yi- Pi)) + 11, i = l,...P1: l i i l  
with: 
where y, is a controlling parameter interpreted here as a reservation level 
I 
- - 
and associated with a given, low value of p (y 1 = pi (e.g. pi = 0.1) while 
- i i 
yi is an additional controlling parameter interpreted as an aspiration level, 
I 
- - - 
associated with a given, high value of pi (yi) = pi (e. g. = 0.9). Fuzzy i 
minimized outcomes can be treated similarly. Outcomes numbered with 
2 i = pl+ 1, ...p can be treated as fuzzy equal goals, with the following 
membership functions: 
- - 2 (llb) pi(yi,yi,~i) = 1 - tanh (a i (y i - Pi)), i = pl+ 1,. . .p; 
2 For fuzzy equal outcomes, special concepts of M-efficiency have been 
introduced, see Seo and Sakawa [19881; such concepts are in fact similar to 
the proper efficiency with a prior bound for the cone C defined as in (2). 
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with: 
- = - 
where y y are interpreted as lower and upper reservation levels, p (7 = 
- 
i' i 
- - 
i i 
pi(yi) = Pi (e-g. 'i = 0.11, while the aspiration level with pi(yi) = 1 is 
located at yi = Pi. Because the function (llb) is monotone with respect to 
ly, - 6, I ,  we can treat the vector membership function p(y,y,~) composed of 
I 
= 
pi(yilyi,yi) for i = 1, ...p as a new outcome vector with the ordering implied 
by the cone C = U f ;  hence, the following scalarizing function can be applied: 
This function satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 5 with p(y,y,y) 
- - =  
treated as an outcome vector and = p(y,y,y) as the controlling parameter 
vector; thus, the conclusions of this theorem apply to this function as 
well. Moreover, the trade-off coefficients between the membership values 
are bounded by 1 + I/& as in Lemma 1. Because of the strict monotonicity 
properties of the function p, it is also possible to show that the original 
A 
outcomes y remain efficient at the maxima of (121, although the bounds on 
their trade-off coefficients are naturally different than 1 + l/c. 
The same conclusions could apply also for piece-wise linear fuzzy 
membership functions - provided such a function would be strictly monotone. 
For a classical definition of a membership function, interpreted as a 
multi-valued logical variable constrained between 0 and 1, there are no 
1 piece-wise linear functions that are strictly monotone for all y E IR . i 
Therefore, in order to preserve the conclusion that all maxima of (12) are 
also efficient in the original outcome space V, it is necessary to use the 
following extended (piece-wise linear) membership functions: 
, " - - -  - -  - 
with p (y .y . = 0, p i l ~ i l i  = 1, where ail ri > 0 can be defined in i i i l  
relation e.g. to given bounds y i,lol Yi,up on yil with possibly additional 
requirements that is concave (which is essential in the case of linear i 
models if the maximization of (12) is to be converted into a linear 
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programming problem). In the case of fuzzy equal goals, the corresponding 
extended membership functions have the form: 
- 
- - 
with ri > 0, pi = 0. 5(Yi+ ii) and (6 y , 1 = 1 corresponding to the 
- i i i i 
aspiration level, while ii and y, are interpreted as the lower and upper 
: - - I -  , " - - -  
reservation levels with p (y ,y ,y 1 = p (7 ,y ,? 1 = 0. For interpret- i i i i  i i i i  
ations in terms of multi-valued logic, the values of the functions can i 
be projected again on the interval [0;11. However, if used instead of p in i 
the maximization of the order-consistent scalarizing function (121, the 
extension of their values beyond this interval is essential for preserving 
the efficiency of the corresponding outcomes y, in the frequent cases when 
I 
the decision maker specifies either attainable aspiration levels or i 
unattainable reservation levels yi3. 
3. Noncooperative Solutions in Multiple Criteria Games. 
We shall show here how the concepts and properties of conical 
separation of sets apply to noncooperative solutions of multiple criteria 
games in normal form. 
Denote players by capital letters, K E K = {A,B, . . N). The decisions x K 
of each player K belong to a specified set of admissible decisions % c %, 
where % is his/her decision space. The decision spaces can be, generally, 
any topological spaces; we assume only that all sets of admissible 
decisions are compact. Thus, the decisions of players can represent as well 
their.mixed strategies, continuous probability distributions in games on a 
square, etc. We assume, however, that the sets % are independent of the 
decisions of other players. Thus, the admissible multi-decisions of all 
players, x = (xA, . . .  xK, . . .  xN), belong to the product of individual 
3 In practical applications, such an extension turns out to be necessary 
even if the (theoretically) strictly monotone membership functions (11) are 
used, in order to preserve their practical monotonicity i.e. to guarantee 
that their derivatives remain above a given lower bound in an interval 
<Yi, 10; Yi , up>' 
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admissible decision sets X = n %. K=A 
For an admissible multi-decision, a multi-outcome y = (yA, ...yK,... YN ) 
is defined. Individual outcomes yK E V are vectors representing individual K 
objectives - interests, values and criteria for each player. We assume that 
multi-outcomes are defined by a continuous multi-outcome function f : X + V 
N 
= n VK. Thus, the individual outcomes are yK = fK(xA, ... xK8...xN). In order 
K=A 
to stress that the individual outcomes for a player depend both on hidher 
own decisions x and on the decisions of other players xI, I * K, it is K 
useful to denote x = % and to introduce individualized outcome functions K 
N N 
fK : % x X + VK defined by fK(uK, X) = fK(xA.. . .xJ, uK, xL,. . .xN). 
Given an admissible multi-decision x E X, the set of attainable out- 
comes Y (x) for player K is defined by all (not only by % = xK) his/her K 
own admissible responses or actions % %: 
N 
while the set of attainable multi-outcomes is Y = f(X1 = f(X,X). 
P~ Assume that individual outcome spaces V = R are finite-dimensional K 
and domination structures in these spaces are implied by positive cones 
CK c VK of the form ( 1 )  or (21. Correspondingly, various types of inequali- 
ties and efficiency can be defined in the individual outcome spaces as well 
N 
as in the multi-outcome space V where the positive cone is C = n . Note 
K=A C~ 
that appropriate sets of efficient outcomes for an individual player K are 
dependent on the multi-decision x (of other players), e.g. in the case of 
properly efficient outcomes with a prior bound on trade-off coefficients: 
Aw A 
with C (E) defined as in ( 3 )  or (4); similarly we define YK(x) or YK(x). K 
A concept of a noncooperative solution of a multiple criteria game was 
introduced e. g. by Bergstresser and Yu 119771 : given a multi-decision 
x E X, any player K would choose only such hidher decisions % E % that 
are in some sense efficient (or Pareto-optimal) with respect to hidher 
positive cone CK. According to the three types of efficiency we can define 
three types of noncooperative solutions to a multiple criteria game. 
The basic type shall be called here noncooperative Pareto-Nash 
solutions. The set of such solutions is defined by: 
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A 
(16) X* = {x* E X: y* = TK($,x*) E YK(x*), V K = A , .  ..N); Y* = f(X*) K 
The most important for applications is another type called here 
noncooperative properly Pareto-Nash solutions with a prior bound (1 + l/c on 
trade-off coefficients). The set of such solutions is defined by: 
for c > 0. For E = 0, (14) defines also noncooperative weakly Pareto-Nash 
solutions. Because ?Pc(x) G (XI S ;(XI for all x E X, we have also K K 
x*" S X* G x * ~ ,  Y*" G Y* G Y*~. If the number of objectives would be 
pK = 1 for each player K, all three types of noncooperative Pareto-Nash 
solutions would coincide with the noncooperative Nash equilibria. 
A n  essential distinction between the sets (131, (14) for pK > 1 and 
the sets of Nash equilibria in single criteria games is that the former 
often contain sets of continuum power while the latter are usually composed 
of discrete points (for nondegenerate games, see e. g. Shapley [ 19741 ). 
Therefore, we must be often satisfied with some reasonable selections of 
points representing the sets (13) or, especially, (14). In order to facili- 
tate such selections and to obtain characterizations of noncooperative 
Pareto-Nash solutions, the concept of a scalarizing function can be useful- 
ly adopted. For convex Y (x) we can use linear separating functions to K 
obtain the following theorem - see Wierzbicki [I9901 for the proof of 
this particular formulation, while earlier results of this type were 
given by Yu 119731 or Zeleny [19761: 
Theorem 5 .  Suppose the sets Y (x) are convex for all x E X. Then, with 
- K 
PK T + E $ = int R+ , the (bi-)linear scalarizing functions s (y X 1 = \yK K K' K 
almost completely characterize the set Y* of noncooperative Pareto-Nash 
outcomes: each such outcome corresponds to a noncooperative Nash equi- 
T librium of a proxy single criteria game with payoffs equal to +y for some 
- 
K 
P 9 e= R+\{o} and any noncooperative Nash equilibrium of the proxy game 
with X E $ gives outcomes in the set Y*. With + E T, these functions K 
W 
completely characterize the set Y* of noncooperative weakly Pareto-Nash 
PK - P 
outcomes. With AK€ gpc= X E int R+ : X ~ i  = +I/ I \J G~ = c/(l+pKc)}, 
J=l 
they completely characterize the set Y*" of noncooperative properly 
Pareto-Nash outcomes with a prior bound 1 + 1/c on trade-off coefficients. 
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This theorem, however, is unsatisfactory because not only the assump- 
tion of convexity of Y (x) is rather strong, but also the resulting charac- K 
terizations are not continuously controllable. Therefore, an application of 
the concept of conical separation gives results that are not only stronger 
theoretically, but give also the possibility of influencing the selection 
of noncooperative Pareto-Nash outcomes continuously by small parameter 
changes; such results follow from the following application of Theorem 4 to 
the case of multiple criteria games: 
P~ Theorem 6. Suppose C = R+ - each player K = A,. . .N in a multiple K 
criteria game maximizes his/her all objectives - and order-consistent 
achievement scalarizing functions s (y y of a form as in (10) with CK(c) K KS K 
as in ( 4 )  are used for a proxy aggregation of these objectives. 
(a) If x*, y* = f(x*) are a noncooperative Nash equilibrium of a proxy 
p~ 
single criteria game with payoffs s (f (XI,? 1 for any yK E R , then they K K K 
are also a noncooperative properly Pareto-Nash solution (with the prior 
bound 1 + l/c on trade-off coefficients) of the multiple criteria game. 
(b) If x*, y* = f (x*) are a noncooperative properly Pareto-Nash 
solution (with a prior bound) of the multiple criteria game, then there 
- - - - 
exists such y = (y A....yK,...yN) - while it is sufficient to take y K = ~ ; -  
that x* and y* = f (x*) correspond to a noncooperative Nash equilibrium of 
the proxy single criteria game. 
Note that above Theorem applies also - with c = 0 - to noncooperative 
weakly Pareto-Nash solutions. An outline of the proof of Theorem 6 
(Wierzbicki, [19901) is as follows. 
Denote r (y I = s (y y 1 with yK E Y (x) defined as in (14). If x*, K k  K K' K K 
y* = f(x*) are a noncooperative Nash equilibrium of a proxy single criteria 
- 
game with payoffs sK(fK(x).yK), then rk attains its maximum over 
yK E YK(x*) at y;. Since r is strictly monotone in the sense of the K 
inequality implied by the cone int C(c), its maximal point is efficient 
with respect to this cone, that is, properly efficient with a prior bound 
on trade-off coefficients, y; E GFe(x*). This applies to any K; hence, x* E 
x*" defined as in (17). 
Conversely, let x* E x * ~ ~ ,  y; E Gr(x*) and take yK = y;, for all K. 
Then the sets yK + int C(c) and yPe(x*) do not intersect and can be K 
strictly separated at iK - * by the function r (y ) = s (y y 1. According 
- Y~ K k  K KS K 
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to Lemma 2, this function attains its maximum over y E YK(x*) at yI;. This K 
applies to any K; thus, x*, y* = f(x*) are a noncooperative Nash 
- 
equilibrium of a proxy single criteria game with payoffs sK(fK(x),yK). 
When using Theorem 6, we should be also able to compute noncooperative 
Pareto-Nash solutions parameterized by aspirat ion points iK. However. 
computing Nash equilibria - especially in non-convex cases - is a difficult 
task in itself. On the other hand, there exists a technique - as suggested 
e. g. by Aubin [I9791 - of converting the computation of Nash equilibria to 
a mathematical programming problem, provided we are ready to use 
nondifferentiable optimization even for the case of differentiable payoffs. 
But the proxy payoff functions s(fK(x),iK) in Theorem 6 are anyway 
nondifferentiable and the nondifferentiable optimization algorithms were 
considerably advanced in the last decade - see e.g. Kiwiel [19851. 
A multi-decision x* is a Nash equilibrium of the proxy scalarized 
- - - 
game, given a controlling parameter vector i = (yA,.. .yK,.. .yN), if and 
only if: 
- 
(17a) w(x*,y) = min w(x,y) = 0 
xex 
where: N 
- - 
(17b) w(x,i) = max (s~(~~(u~,x),Y~) - sK(fK(x), yK)) 
ueX K=A 
4. Applications of Multiple Criteria Games. 
Most of existing applications of multiple criteria games are related 
to concepts of cooperative solutions in such games - see Bergstresser and 
Yu [19771, Seo and Sakawa [19881, Bronisz et al. [19891. However, it can be 
argued that in order to reasonably model and analyze real-life game-like 
multiple criteria problems, the analysis of possible noncooperative 
solutions should precede the proposals for cooperative ones. Such an 
analysis should also include the possibility of special disequilibrium 
processes of conflict escalation type. 
The computation of an equilibrium say, of Nash noncooperative type in 
a single criteria game, is based on the assumption that preferences (payoff 
functions) of all players are known to each other. In a multiple criteria 
game we must still assume that at least the type of objectives and the 
corresponding reference points for each player are known. However, in 
real-life situations even such information would be strategically guarded; 
any player would have to guess and assume the objectives and the reference 
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points of other players. If some of the players guessed incorrectly, their 
decisions would not correspond to any equilibrium and the outcomes of such 
decisions might be worse than expected. In a repetitive game, this could 
lead to revised assessments of the preferences of other players, with a 
psychological tendency to blame them and to retaliate - while the original 
lack of information should be rather blamed and the retaliation leads to a 
process of conflict escalation. 
An example of such an analysis for a multiple criteria model of a 
conflict over fishery rights was given in Wierzbicki [19901. The problem of 
possible conflicts arising when fishing fleets of various countries compete 
should be actually modeled by a dynamic, nonlinear and multi-objective, 
stochastic game. As a dynamic single-objective game it was investigated 
e.g. by Hamalainen, 119761; various experimental games with computer 
simulation have been also used to study the problem. However, in order to 
see the main reasons of a possible conflict escalation, a rather simplified 
model of such a game is sufficient, provided it stresses the multi- 
objective character of the problem. 
Consider only two countries A and B with fishing fleets of sizes x A 
B 
and x . Suppose only such varieties of sea fish are considered that spawn 
in the rivers either of country A or of country B; therefore, it makes 
sense to speak about stocks z and zB of fish originating in either of A 
these countries and returning for breeding to the coastal waters and rivers 
of this country. In the open sea both countries can catch both types of 
fish; fishing in coastal waters by another country is assumed (for 
simplicity) to be prohibited. 
A very simplified but nonlinear model of fish catches assumes that a 
part of the joint stock zA + z can be caught in the open sea B 
proportionally to the relative number of fishing boats of respective 
country, but with catching intensity decreasing exponentially when the 
joint number of boats increases. A part of the remaining fish of the type 
z can be then caught in the coastal waters of country A, again with A 
exponentially decreasing catching intensity when the number of boats 
increases; similarly for country B. We assume that country A (similarly B) 
can influence - e.g. through various fiscal incentives - the number of 
boats x sent to open sea and x to its coastal waters, where: 
A, 1 A, 2 
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The catch of country A (similarly for B) is a~~roximated'by: 
where c is the catch in the open sea: 
A, 0 
Thus, only z exp(-a(xASl+ x 1) of the initial stock zA remains (where A B, 1 
a is an appropriate coefficient) and returns to the coastal waters. 
Therefore, the catch c in the coastal waters is: 
A, c 
Again. only zAexp(-a(xA, l+ xA, 2+ xB, ) )  of the initial stock zA remains for 
breeding. The breeding coefficient r(z exp(-a(xADl+ x A A, 2+ x 1 ) )  is B, 1 
actually a function of this number and of various other random factors; for 
simplicity, we assume it to be a constant r. Thus, the fish stock next 
fishing season is: 
Actually, Eq. (22) and a similar one for the stock zB should be 
considered as basic dynamic equations for a long-term dynamic model of the 
game. On the other hand, we can also consider the stock in next fishing 
season as one of the objectives of countries A or B in a static, repetitive 
game. We could formulate various objectives for such a game; but in order 
to illustrate the issues of conflict escalation, it is sufficient to 
analyze two objectives for each country. 
The first objective for country A (similarly for country B) represents 
the interests of fishers, who must maintain their fleets; thus, they are 
primarily interested in the level of fish catch: 
The second objective represents more aggregated interests of country 
A, including the catch, but also subtracting the relative cost of fishing 
and taking into account the future value of fish stock expected for the 
next fishing season: 
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where p, b are appropriate coefficients (similarly for country B). 
When analyzing such a game, it can be shown that fishing in own 
coastal waters might be profitable for individual fishermen but not for the 
entire fisher community (fish comes to the coastal waters depleted by the 
catch in open sea where also the other country is fishing; thus, the total 
catch decreases if a boat is fishing in coastal waters instead of in open 
sea) and certainly not good for the aggregated interests of the country. 
This might lead to internal conflicts; in order to concentrate on external 
conflicts, letusassumex = x  A,2 B,2 = 0. 
For the remaining part of the game, the sets of noncooperative Pareto- 
Nash solutions can be computed for assumed parameter values. These 
solutions were computed in Wierzbicki 119901 not according to the 
characterization (17a, b) but with the help of penalty functions for proxy 
constraints (which is actually an equivalent computational approach under 
additional assumptions). The problem of representing the results (sets in 
the four-dimensional space of objectives of countries A and B) can be 
resolved by drawing on the plane 
'A, 2' YB, 2 ) the level sets of 
corresponding values y , y = (cA, cB). An example of such results is 
given in Fig. 1. 
The sets of Pareto-Nash noncooperative equilibria are denoted in 
Fig. 1 by continuous lines of level sets for cA, c There are two such B' 
sets: a bigger one at reasonably high levels of aggregated objectives y A, 2' 
'B, 2 and a smaller one at much lower levels of these objectives (and higher 
catches; this smaller set corresponds to overfishing the sea). However, 
even when starting at a point in the bigger set, a conflict escalation 
process PI - P2 - P3 - P4 - P5 can develop. Suppose the fishers of the 
country B wanted a bigger catch than at the point PI and the country could 
not control them; the point thus shifted to P2. All depends now on the 
reaction of country A. If it tries to communicate with country B, perhaps 
with the help of an international agency, conflict escalation might be 
prevented. If, instead, its fishers insist on catching at least as much 
fish as country B and send more boats, the solution shifts again to 
disequilibrium P3. After further such "adjustments", the process ends at an 
equilibrium point P5 - however, at much lower level of aggregated 
objectives yA, 2, 
'El, 2 and with few fish remaining for next season. 
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Fig. 1. An example of a conflict escalation process for the fishery 
A game (witha.0.4, r = 5 ,  z A = z  = 5 ,  x = x B = 5 ,  p=0.5andb=0.4). B 
Another example of an educational study of conflict escalation 
processes is an experimental, multiple criteria game "Humble Shall be 
Rewarded" (Wierzbicki [I99211 with a simple mechanics, where two players 
show at one time a selected number from 0 to 5 fingers or plastic chips, 
for 50 rounds - or less, depending on specific stopping rules. The game 
has, however, a rather complicated payoff structure with two apparent 
objectives: winning points and money (small financial rewards are given to 
the players by the organizer of the game) which are not directly 
correlated. The game has also many rationality traps and novice players 
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might easily start a conflict escalation process; but the stopping rules 
penalize heavily such players. To play the game well, players must change 
their strategic perspective, discover and concentrate on other, substitute 
objectives hidden in the stopping rules of the game; they must learn to 
avoid conflict escalation, to develop implicit cooperation, to communicate 
with the opponent (by the single allowed medium - the sequence of numbers 
of chips played). The game is thus rather challenging - since changing a 
strategic perspective is a difficult task for most players. 
Experiments with this game have shown that there are several distinct 
strategic perspectives with corresponding distinct substitute objectives 
and types of strategies that might be discovered by players when they 
improve their skills. The more creative and adaptable players learn sooner, 
thus the game might be a good test of such abilities. The game has 
analogies in real life (honor versus money) and provides a good educational 
medium for teaching that a change of perspective - which consist in 
changing the hierarchy of objectives or even adopting new objectives - is 
often necessary when solving difficult problems, particularly when they 
include the danger of conflict escalation. Thus, the game is a practical 
tool for enlarging habitual domains in the sense of Yu [19901. 
5 .  Conclusions. 
The paper shows that it is possible to characterize Pareto-Nash 
noncooperative solutions of a multiple criteria game as Nash equilibria of 
a proxy single criteria game with payoffs equal to parameterized 
scalarizing functions, even in nonconvex or discrete cases. The best type 
of such functions are order-consistent achievement scalarizing functions: 
beside an appropriate type of monotonicity, they have also a special 
conical separation property. This characterization makes it possible to 
compute Pareto-Nash noncooperative solutions by nondifferentiable 
optimization or other equivalent algorithms and to analyze examples of 
multiple criteria conflict situations. 
Because of the essential multiplicity of noncooperative Pareto-Nash 
solutions, conflict escalation processes can easily occur in multiple 
criteria games, particularly if the players do not communicate. When 
avoiding the danger of conflict escalation, a change of strategic 
perspective - involving different hierarchies of objectives or even 
adopting new objectives - is often necessary. 
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